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OSBORNE V. OHIO: DoEs IT MEAN THE END OF THE
PROTECTION AFFORDED BY STANLEY?
The Supreme Court in Osborne v. Ohio I held that the first amendment
does not prohibit states from outlawing the possession of child pornogra-
phy in the home.2 The Court's ruling has commentators3 scrambling to
assess whether the decision will undermine the Court's previous decision,
in Stanley v. Georgia,4 recognizing a constitutional right to read and
watch what one pleases in one's home.
The Court long has recognized that the first amendment's mandate,
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech,"5 is
not an unconditional guarantee.' Rather, the Court has formulated ex-
ceptions for categories of speech that do not warrant first amendment
protections.7 Obscenity falls within this category of Court-made excep-
tions;8 defining obscenity, however, has been troublesome.9
The Supreme Court defined"0 and redefined 11 "obscenity" in a series
I. 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990).
2. Im at 1697. A state statute prohibiting the possession of child pornography, however, must
not be overbroad, otherwise, it may be deemed unconstitutional. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413
U S. 601, 615 (1973) (the scope of the statute is unconstitutional only if the overbreadth is not only
"real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statutes plainly legitimate sweep").
3. See Child Porn Ruling by Court is Studied for Wider Effect, Wall St. J., April 23, 1990, at
B7 Col. 4 ("The logic of the court's opinion... has alarmed some legal experts .... Of course, legal
experts don't all agree on the impact of the ruling").
4. 294 U.S. 557 (1969).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) ("[it] is well understood that
the right to free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances").
7. Id. at 571-72. "There are certain... classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any (clonstitutional problem. These include the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting. . .". Id. (footnotes omitted).
8. Id. at 572.
9. See infra notes 11-15 and accompanying text. The Court's difficulty with obscenity issues
lies in the various definitions of the term. See Jacobelli v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (obscenity
may be undefinable, but "I know it when I see it") (Stewart, J., concurring).
10. The Supreme Court first defined "obscenity" in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
The test was "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." Id. at 489.
11. The Court subsequently clarified Roth's obscenity definition in Redrup v. New York, 386
U.S. 767 (1967) (per curiam). The new test required a community standard of judgment in assessing
whether the material was "utterly without redeeming social value." Id. at 771. The Redrup test
proved to be very subjective and the Court found itself frequently determining whether material was
obscene. Justice Harlan, in criticizing the Court's approach, stated that "anyone who undertakes to
examine the Court's decisions since Roth which have held particular material obscene or not obscene
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of opinions before settling upon the current rule developed in the 1973
case, Miller v. California.2 Miller provides the standard for courts to
determine whether the first amendment protects sexually explicit
speech.
13
The Court, in Stanley v. Georgia,'4 created an important exception to
the general rule that the first amendment does not protect obscene
speech.II In Stanley the Court reversed the conviction of a private citi-
zen for the possession of films 6 that the lower court found obscene. The
Stanley Court unanimously agreed that there exists a constitutional right
to read and watch what one pleases in one's home. 7 Nevertheless, the
Court has applied Stanley narrowly,"8 and has stated that the rule does
not protect obscene material viewed outside the home.' 9 Subsequent
courts have limited Stanley's application faithfully, holding that the first
would find himself in utter bewilderment." Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 707
(1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
12. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, stated:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether "the average person, apply-
ing contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, ap-
peals to the prurient interest...; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.
Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
13. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1972). Throughout this Recent Development, the
terms "obscenity" or "obscene" refer to material that meets the Miller standard and does not involve
depictions of children. "Child pornography" is used only in reference to visual sexual depictions
involving children. "Non-obscene" material refers to pornography that falls outside the Miller ob-
scenity standard.
14. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). The members of the Stanley Court included Chief Justice Warren and
Justices Brennan, Black, Douglas, Fortas, Harlan, Marshall, Stewart, and White, only one of whom
currently remains on the Court-White.
15. See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text.
16. While searching Stanley's home for evidence of bookmaking, federal agents discovered
three reels of eight-millimeter film. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 558.
17. Id. at 565. "If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business
telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch."
Id.
18. See Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First Amend-
ment, 123 U. PA. L. Rsv. 45, 71-72 (1974).
19. See State v. Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 46-47, 503 N.E.2d 697, 701-02 at n.5 (1986)
("Stanley draws a line at the front door of the home"), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 937 (1987); Paris Adult
Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (protection does not extend to material exhibited in the
"privacy" of adult theaters); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971) (Stanley does not extend to
the delivery of obscene material); United States v. 12 200-ft. Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S.
123 (1973) (rejecting application of Stanley to importation of obscene material for personal use).
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and fourth amendment protections upon which the decision was based2'
do not extend to the right to deliver or import obscene material, 2 1 the
right to possess or show obscene material outside the home,2 2 or the right
to engage privately in any type of consensual adult conduct within the
home.23
In the 1970's child pornography gained notoriety in the United
States.24 Congress and state legislatures responded by enacting statutes
aimed at attacking the problem.25 Many of the statutes prohibited all
pornography involving children, regardless of whether it was obscene
under the Miller test.26
The Supreme Court addressed first the constitutionality of state stat-
utes regulating nonobscene child pornography. In the landmark case,
New York v. Ferber,27 a New York trial court convicted the defendant of
20. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568. "we hold that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit
making mere private possession of obscene material a crime." Id. See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 207 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Stanley rested as much on the court's understand-
ing of the Fourth Amendment as it did on the First").
21. See United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971) (a person's right to possess obscene mate-
rial does not necessarily encompass the right to receive obscene material); United States v. 12,200-Ft.
Reels of Super 8MM. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973) (rejecting argument that Stanley protects importa-
tion of obscene material for personal use); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363
(1971) (Stanley does not protect the importation of obscene material for commercial use).
22. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (Stanley does not protect obscene mate-
rial shown in the "privacy" of an adult theater).
23. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186 (the state constitutionally may criminalize at-home adult consen-
sual homosexual conduct).
24. See I ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 599-601
(1986) [hereinafter AToRNEY GENERAL'S REPORT]; Note, Child Pornography: A New Role for the
Obscenity Doctrine, 1978 U. ILL. L. REv. 711, 713 (noting the difficulty of pinpointing when child
pornography first appeared in America, the author nevertheless states that "[t]he use of children in
pornography did not become widespread until sometime after 1970.. ."); Comment, Preying on
Playgrounds: The Exploitation of Children in Pornography and Prostitution, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV.
809, 810 (1978) ("By 1976, child pornography had become a featured item among obscenity
dealers").
25. For example, see ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, para. 11-20.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991) ("[a]
person commits the offense of child pornography... [when] with the knowledge of the nature or
content thereof... [he] possesses any visual reproductions of any child.., engaged in any [prohib-
ited sexual] activity"). See also ALA. CODE § 13-A-12-192 (1982); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
3553 (1978); FLA. STAT. § 827.071 (1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3516 (Cum. Supp. 1985); MINN.
STAT. § 617.247 (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.322 (Anderson Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5a-3 (Cum. Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68A.07 (1984). See generally Shouvlin,
Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A ModelAct, 17 WAKE FORESr L. REv. 535 (1981);
Note, Child Pornography Legislation, 17 J. FAM. L. 505 (1979).
26. See supra note 13.
27. 458 U.S. 747 (1982). Ferber was the Supreme Court's "[f]irst examination of a statute
directed at, and limited to depictions of sexual activity involving children." Id. The members of the
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selling child pornography2" in violation of a New York statute.2 9 The
statute did not require the depiction of a child's sexual performance to
meet the legal definition of obscenity.30 The Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court's holding that child pornography, even if not "obscene,"31 is
not protected by the first amendment.32 The Court determined that the
state's interest in protecting children from the harm of sexual exploita-
tion "overwhelmingly outweighs" any first amendment interest.33 Thus,
Ferber Court were Chief Justice Burger and Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun, O'Connor, Pow-
ell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and White. Only Brennan, Marshall, and White participated in both Stanley
and Ferber.
28. The films depicted one boy masturbating and a group of boys engaging in sexual conduct.
Ia at 752.
29. The state indicted Ferber for violations of New York Penal Law §§ 263.10 and 263.15. See
infra note 30.
30. The statute provides:
263.00 Definitions:
As used in this article the following definitions shall apply:
1. "Sexual performance" means any performance or part thereof which includes sexual
conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age.
2. "Obscene sexual performance" means any performance which includes sexual con-
duct by a child less than sixteen years of age in any material which is obscene, as such term
is defined in section 235.00 of this chapter.
3. "Sexual conduct" means actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual inter-
course, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sado-masochistic abuse, or lewd exhibition of the
genitals.
4. "Performance" means any play, motion picture, photograph or dance. Performance
also means any other visual representation exhibited before an audience.
5. "Promote" means to procure, manufacture, issue, sell, give, provide, send, mail, de-
liver, transfer, transmute, publish, distribute, present, exhibit or advertise, or to offer or
agree to do the same.
263.10 Promoting an obscene sexual performance by a child.
A person is guilty of promoting an obscene sexual performance by a child when, know-
ing the character and content thereof, he produces, directs or promotes any obscene per-
formance which includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age.
263.15 Promoting a sexual performance by a child.
A person is guilty of promoting sexual performance by a child when, knowing the char-
acter and content thereof, he produces, directs, or promotes any performance which in-
cludes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age.
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 263, 263.10, 263.15 (McKinney 1977).
31. The Court applied the Miller standard of obscene. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-58. See supra
notes 13, 15 and accompanying text.
32. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763-64 ("When a definable class of material, such as [child pornogra-
phy], bears so heavily and pervasively on the welfare of children ... the balance of competing
interests is clearly struck and ... it is permissible to consider these materials as without the protec-
tion of the First Amendment").
33. The Court concluded from legislative judgment and applicable literature that child pornog-
raphy caused physiological, emotional, and mental damage to the child participants. Id. at 758.
Accordingly, the Court enunciated five reasons justifying greater state regulation when child pornog-
raphy is targeted: (1) the compelling state interest in safeguarding the physical and psychological
well-being of minors; (2) the relationship between the distribution of child pornography and the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss3/15
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Ferber gave the states greater latitude in regulating child pornography;
they can regulate its production and distribution, regardless of whether
the material is legally obscene.34
Ferber involved the public sale of child pornography, and thus has no
effect upon Stanley's at-home privacy interest. After Ferber, the only
distinction between state regulation of adult and child pornography was
the nature of materials regulated, not the manner of regulation. In Os-
borne v. Ohio,3" however, the Supreme Court further distinguished child
pornography from the pornographic material protected in Stanley.36
In Osborne, an Ohio trial court found the defendant guilty of violating
an Ohio statute37 prohibiting the possession of child pornography.3" The
sexual abuse of children; (3) the economic motives that are an integral part of the production of such
pornography; (4) "[t]he value of permitting live performances and photographic reproductions of
children engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de minimus ;" and (5) a con-
tent-based analysis of first amendment protection found not to be incompatible with earlier prece-
dent. Id. at 756-64.
For an in-depth discussion of the Court's use of content-based analysis, see generally Stone, Con-
tent Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 189 (1983).
34. The Court clearly stated that the first amendment does not restrict a state from prohibiting
nonobscene child pornography:
[T]he question under the Miller test of whether a work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest of the average person bears no connection to the issue of whether a child
has been physically or psychologically harmed in the production of the work. Similarly, a
sexually explicit depiction need not be "patently offensive" in order to have required the
sexual exploitation of a child for its production. In addition, a work which, taken on the
whole, contains serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value may nevertheless em-
body the hardest core of child pornography.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761. However, state regulation of child pornography is subject to limitations set
forth by the Court in Ferber: (1) the conduct must be defined adequately by the statute's language or
the state courts' interpretation of such statute; (2) some element of scienter must be required on the
part of the accused; and (3) only live performances or visual reproductions of live performances are
not constitutionally protected. Id at 764.
35. 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990). An earlier decision by the Ohio Supreme Court used similar analy-
sis in upholding the right of the state to prohibit the possession of child pornography. See State v.
Meadows, 28 Ohio St. 3d 43, 503 N.E.2d 697 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 937 (1987).
36. Stanley protects home viewing and possession of pornography depicting adults in sexual
portrayals.
37. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2907.323(AX3) (Baldwin 1989) provides:
(A) No person shall do any of the following:
(3) Possess or view any material or performance that shows a minor who is not the
person's child or ward in a state of nudity, unless one of the following applies:
(a) The material or performance is sold, disseminated, displayed, possessed,
controlled, brought or caused to be brought into this state, or presented for
a bona fide artistic, medical, scientific, educational, religious, governmen-
tal, judicial, or other proper purpose, by or to a physician, psychologist,
sociologist, scientist, teacher, person pursuing bona fide studies or re-
search, librarian, clergyman, prosecutor, judge, or other person having a
proper interest in the material or performance.
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intermediate appellate court and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed, find-
ing no merit in Osborne's assertion that the first amendment protects the
private possession of child pornography.3 9
The Supreme Court, after determining that its previous decision in
Stanley did not compel a contrary result, held that a state may constitu-
tionally proscribe the possession of child pornography.' The Court dis-
tinguished Stanley on the basis of the asserted state interest. In Stanley,
the state sought to proscribe private possession of pornographic material
because of the poisonous effect on the minds of viewers. 4' Conversely, in
Osborne, the state had no paternalistic interest in regulating Osborne's
mind; rather the state sought to protect the victims of child pornogra-
phy.42 The Court concluded that "[it] is evident beyond the need for
elaboration that a State's interest in 'safeguarding the physical and psy-
chological well-being of a minor is compelling. '4 3 Because of the state's
compelling interest in Osborne, the Court supported the state's attempt
to stamp out the vice of child pornography at all levels.44 The Court
found a reasonable connection between penalizing the possession of child
pornography and encouraging decreased production by virtue of de-
creased demand.45 No similar connection existed in Stanley .46
Finally, the Court examined the negative impact of child pornography
upon children.47 After weighing all considerations, the Court found that
(b) The person knows that the parents, guardian, or custodian has consented
in writing to the photographing or use of the minor in a state of nudity and
to the manner in which the material or performance is used or transferred.
38. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1695. The police found in the defendant's home photographs of nude
male adolescents posed in sexually explicit positions.
39. Id
40. Id. Other issues the Court addressed included whether the Ohio statute was overbroad and
whether the failure to instruct the jury on an element of child pornography violated due process.
The Court found the Ohio statute not violative of the first amendment, but remanded because failure
to instruct on an element of child pornography under the Ohio statute violated due process. Id. at
1697-1705.
41. See supra notes 14, 16-25 and accompanying text.
42. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1696.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1697. The Court's decision in Ferber effectively limited the states' regulatory efforts
to the production and distribution of child pornography, thus driving much of the child pornogra-
phy market underground.
45. Id.
46. In Stanley, the Court rejected Georgia's argument that its prohibition on obscenity posses.
sion was a necessary element incident to its proscription on the distribution of obscenity. Stanley,
394 U.S. at 567-68.
47. The court referred to the resulting permanent effects of the child's abuse and the frequent
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the state's interest in protecting children from the harm resulting from
the possession of child pornography far outweighed the protection of first
amendment interests.48
The consequences of the Osborne decision on freedom of speech re-
main to be seen; it has aroused a great deal of debate from two camps.49
Critics of Osborne fear that the decision unwisely erodes Stanley's pro-
tections and ultimately will lead to broader restrictions on freedom of
speech.5" At a minimum, many fear that the decision will lead to permis-
sible bans upon the possession of adult pornography in the home.51
The other camp argues that the Court's decision in Osborne does not
represent a dramatic shift in freedom of speech protection.52 Because of
the unique circumstances involved with child pornography, proponents
argue it is unlikely that the decision will lead to further freedom of
speech restrictions.53
Justice Brennan's dissent in Osborne reflects the views of those who
fear that the Court struck an improper balance, which ultimately will
create inroads into constitutional barriers against unwarranted state in-
trusion.54 In Brennan's view, the majority's reliance upon Ferber is mis-
placed; Ferber merely puts child pornography on the same footing as
obscenity in establishing what materials the state may regulate, not in
determining the manner of regulation.55 Justice Brennan strongly stated
his broad view of freedom of speech:
use of existing child pornography by pedophiles to seduce other children to engage in sexual activity.
Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1697.
48. Id. Pointing to dicta in Stanley, the court determined that its ruling did not conflict be-
cause Stanley recognized that compelling reasons may overcome the privacy right of individuals to
possess materials. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1696 (Court did not "mean to express any opinion on
statutes making criminal possession of other types of printed, filmed, or recorded materials.... In
such cases, compelling state interests may exist for overriding the right of the individual to possess
those materials") (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568 n. 11).
49. See Child-Porn Ruling by Court Is Studied For Wider Effect, Wall St. J., April 23, 1990, at
B7.
50. For example, the Osborne decision may lead to intrusion into the home whenever the gov-
ernment believes a private activity perpetuates a market that exploits others. Justice Brennan pro-
vided another example in his Osborne dissent by hypothesizing that under the majority's reasoning a
state may illegalize the possession of newspapers that were produced in violation of child labor laws.
Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1715 n.19 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1705.
52. Wall St. J., supra note 49, at B7.
53. Id.
54. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1715 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 1712-13 ("Ferber held only that child pornography is a category of material the
production and distribution of which is not entitled to First Amendment protection; our decision did
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When speech is eloquent and the ideas expressed lofty, it is easy to find
restrictions on them invalid. But were the First Amendment limited to
such discourse, our freedom would be sterile indeed. Mr. Osborne's pic-
tures may be distasteful, but the Constitution guarantees both his right to
possess them privately and his right to avoid punishment under an over-
broad law.56
Persuasive arguments exist that Osborne represents a natural extension
of previous freedom of speech decisions as well as child protection laws.
The Ferber finding that child pornography causes harm to children sup-
ports the distinction made between possession of child pornography and
possession of obscenity.
Arguably, generally pornographic material harms those who partici-
pate. 7 The harm to a child, however, is qualitatively different: the long-
term loss of privacy and fear of disclosure; the use of child pornography
as an inducement in child molestation; and the illegality of the act por-
trayed.5" Therefore, the differences between child pornography and
adult pornography lie both in the degree of harm suffered by the partici-
pant and in the degree to which society considers the harm substantial.
Furthermore, the Osborne exception may be consistent with numerous
other exceptions for children.59 The Court has held that when an inva-
sion of protected freedoms occurs, "[tihe state's authority over children's
activities is broader than over like actions of adults."'  Thus, the state
may overcome a defendant's first amendment rights when the protection
of a child is at stake.
At this juncture it is unclear whether Osborne's child pornography ex-
ception will mean the re-evaluation or end of Stanley: whether courts
will construe Osborne narrowly, limiting its holding to children, or will
not extend to private possession ... the distinction established in Stanley between what materials
may be regulated and how they may be regulated still stands) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 1717.
57. Current research seems to lend support to a "viewing-doing" connection when adults view
violent pornography. See, eg., ATORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 25.
58. Osborne, 110 S. Ct. at 1697.
59. See e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) ("states may limit the freedom of
children to make affirmative choices that have potentially serious consequences"); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (at viability, the state's interest in protecting the life of the fetus is compelling and
overcomes the woman's privacy interest); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (statute
prohibiting the sale of pornography to minors upheld); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (difference in
procedural rights of adults and juveniles); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (state child
labor law upheld over first amendment objections).
60. Prince, 321 U.S. at 168.
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make Osborne the first step in allowing interference in what people do in
the privacy of their own homes.
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